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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellant Neil Campbell ("Campbell") was convicted of thirteen counts of contempt 
punishable by criminal sanctions ("Criminal Contempt") for testifying falsely during a sworn 
debtor's examination taken by Respondents C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings 
Limited Partnership (collectively, "Respondents"). Campbell was also found guilty of two 
factually unrelated counts of contempt punishable by civil sanctions ("Civil Contempt") due to 
his failure to produce documents that the court had ordered him to produce. Only the Criminal 
Contempt sentence is at issue in this appeal. In this regard, Campbell challenges only the 
sentence-he does 11ot challenge the district court's findings. Citing Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 75(i)(2)(D) ("Rule 75(i)(2f') as well as United States and Idaho Constitutional 
privileges against self-incrimination ("Privileges"), Campbell maintains that the district court 
was foreclosed from imposing the 65 day jail sentence for Campbell's contempt because 
Campbell was required to take the witness stand on unrelated Civil Contempt charges that-
without objection from Campbell- were tried together with the Criminal Charges. On this basis 
alone, Campbell aims to vacate the jail sentence sanction. Campbell is incorrect and the sanction 
should stand for two reasons. 
First, as the district court recognized and Campbell does not assert otherwise, the Civil 
and Criminal contempt counts were factually unrelated. This, of course, makes for a different 
case than the ones to which Campbell relies, namely, trials of factually related civil and criminal 
counts. As to the discrete Criminal Contempt counts, Campbell was given the right not to take 
the stand. As to the unrelated Civil Contempt counts, Campbell was ordered to take the stand 
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but nevertheless given the right to invoke the Privileges, which he did, albeit with negative 
inferences drawn solely as to the Civil Contempt counts. As even Campbell acknowledged, had 
the civil counts been tried during a separate proceeding, the district court could permissibly 
compel Campbell to take the witness stand and be examined as to the facts underlying the civil 
contempt counts. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("Tr.") Vol. I, p. 256, L. 11-13. 
Second, all of the above aside, any error of which Campbell complains was harmless and 
not grounds for reversal. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 
106, 122 (2014) ("A party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged errors were 
prejudicial"). Indeed, Campbell does not articulate in his brief on appeal how having to take the 
stand created any prejudice given that the district court permitted Campbell to assert the 
Privileges on the stand (which Campbell did) without prejudice to the Criminal Contempt counts. 
Moreover, in the context of a bench trial, the judge is presumed to have relied on only competent 
evidence and disregarded incompetent evidence. State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707, 710 (1991). 
And here, the district court expressly stated that its findings of fact regarding the Criminal 
Contempt counts were 1101 based on Campbell taking the stand. Thus, Campbell was not 
prejudiced and any alleged error is harmless. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS/STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The contempt proceeding giving rise to this appeal derives from a judgment entered 
against Campbell and for Respondents by a Los Angeles Superior Court for over $24 million. 
("Judgment"). The Judgment represented a combination of compensatory and enhanced 
damages for breach of contract, fraud and RICO violations committed by Campbell in the course 
of his business relationship with the Respondents. Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R."), p. 489 
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(Contempt Judgment ,r 12); R., pp. 285- 306 & 306- 11 (Am. RJN Exs. F & G). During the 
litigation, Campbell repeatedly flouted the discovery process- including by refusing to respond 
to written discovery and failing to attend his deposition. R., p. 489 (Contempt Judgment ,r,r l 0-
11 ); R., pp. 278- 80 & 281- 84 (Am. RJN Ex. D & E). Campbell's discovery abuses were 
sufficiently egregious that the California court imposed monetary sanctions, terminating 
sanctions, struck Campbell's answer, and entered a default against him. R., p. 489 (Contempt 
Judgment ,r,r 10-1); R., pp. 278- 80 (Am. RJN Ex. D); R., pp. 281- 84 (Am. RJN Ex. E); R., p. 
188 (Am. RJN Ex. F. at 2).1 Later, Campbell was found guilty of a felony by a Los Angeles jury 
as a result of his fraud on the Respondents. 
On June 21, 2012, after filing the California Judgment in Idaho, Plaintiffs obtained an 
order from the district court domesticating the Judgment in Idaho. R., p. 489 (Contempt 
Judgment ,r 13); Pis.' Trial Ex. 12. On March 23, 2015, the district court granted Respondents' 
Motion for a Judgment Debtor's Examination. R., p. 489 (Contempt Judgment ,r 14); Def. 's 
Trial Ex. 511. The district court amended this order twice, first on April 1, 2015, and again on 
August 3, 2015, to change the date for the debtor's examination. R., pp. 489- 90 (Contempt 
Judgment ,r 14); Pis.' Trial Ex. 13; Def.'s Trial Exs. 512 & 513. 
A. Facts Relating to the Civil Contempt Charges. 
The Amended Order compelling Campbell to appear for a debtor's examination also 
required Campbell to produce, inter alia, documents "evidencing any payments made by 
Defendant to any legal counsel over the period of 2009 to present, including documents 
The facts underlying the Judgment are recited by the district court in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R., pp. 488- 89 (Contempt Judgment ,i,i 6- 9). 
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evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments," and "all records relating to 
financial accounts (savings accounts, checking accounts, or otherwise) maintained in 
Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for the time period commencing January 1, 
2012 to the present date." R., p. 490 (Contempt Judgment ,r 15); Pis.' Trial Ex. 13-2 & 13-3. 
The Amended Order required Campbell to produce the responsive documents no later than April 
13, 2015. R., p. 490 (Contempt Judgment ,r 16); Pis.' Trial Ex. 13-2. Campbell was initially 
charged with ten counts of Civil Contempt for failure to produce responsive documents. R., pp. 
32- 33. Following Campbell's untimely production of additional documents, only two of those 
counts were tried. 
At trial, Campbell was called to testify about his failure to produce two categories of 
records: (1) documents evidencing his payments to one of his lawyers, David Flyer; and (2) 
documents relating to a bank account he opened at HSBC in Hong Kong. Tr. Vol. I, p. 160~ L. 
22 - p. 201, L. 25. He was also examined about the completeness of his recent production of the 
documents at issue in civil contempt Charges Two through Seven, which Respondents then 
dismissed. Id.; R., p. 488 {Contempt Judgment ,r 6). The district court found Campbell guilty of 
two counts of civil contempt for failing to produce documents related to his payments to Flyer 
and documents relating to the HSBC Hong Kong account. R., pp. 494-99, 530-31 (Contempt 
Judgment ,r,r 37- 69, 176- 85). 
B. Facts Relating to the Criminal Contempt Charges. 
On August 24, 2015, Campbell appeared before the district court for a debtor's 
examination. R., p. 500 (Contempt Judgment ,r 71); Pis.' Trial Ex. 1-4. The court put Campbell 
under oath prior to the debtor's examination. R., p. 500 {Contempt Judgment ,r 71); Pis.' Trial 
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Ex. 1-3. During the examination, Respondents' counsel asked Campbell a series of basic 
questions about his finances and living situation. To nearly every one of these questions, 
Campbell responded "I don't know" or "I don't remember." R., p. 500 {Contempt Judgment 
172). 
Because of Campbell's false sworn testimony, Respondents brought 23 separate Criminal 
Contempt charges against Campbell pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-601(4), which provides that 
deceit by a party to a special proceeding constitutes a contempt of court. Each of the criminal 
contempt charges set forth in the Charging Affidavit related solely to Campbell's untruthful 
testimony during his August 24, 2015 debtor's examination. R., pp. 33-47. The charged lies 
relate to (a) the source of funds Campbell used to open his Bank of America account, his car, and 
where he lived (Counts 11- 17); {b) the source of a large cash deposit to Campbell's Bank of 
America Account (Count 18); (c) Campbell's claim that he did not remember the name of the 
company in whose name he opened the HSBC Hong Kong account (Count 19); (d) the source of 
large cash deposits to Campbell's Zions bank account {Counts 20-30); and (e) how Campbell 
paid his rent during a time when his bank records did not reflect payments (Counts 31- 34). 
C. The Trial. 
On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit setting forth Civil Contempt 
counts (for failure to produce documents) and Criminal Contempt counts (stemming from 
Campbell's sworn lies). R., pp. 486- 87 (Contempt Judgment 12). On February 22, 2016, the 
district court held a hearing at which the court informed Campbell of all of the counts against 
him and advised him of his rights, including his right to remain silent. R., p. 487 (Contempt 
Judgment 13). In May 2016, the Court appointed counsel to represent Campbell. R., p. 153. 
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Prior to trial, the parties engaged in motion practice. At no time did Campbell move to bifurcate 
the civil and criminal contempt charges. R., pp. 7- 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 256, L. 22-25. 
The district court held a bench trial on July 26 to July 27, 2016, during which the court 
heard both the Civil and Criminal Contempt counts. R., p. 487 (Contempt Judgment ,i 5). 
During the trial, Respondents called Campbell as a witness to testify as to the Civil Contempt 
counts. R., p. 488 (Contempt Judgment ,i 6). The district court permitted this over Campbell's 
objections because it correctly found that the Civil and Criminal Contempt counts were factually 
distinct. Tr. Vol. I, p. 157, L. 22 - p. 158, L. 4. As the district court recognized, Campbell was 
questioned solely regarding the Civil Contempt counts. Respondents' counsel made "no attempt 
to cross-examine Campbell on the criminal contempt charges." R., p. 488 (Contempt Judgment ,i 
6). Moreover, Campbell was given the right to invoke the Privileges during this limited 
questioning and did in fact invoke the Privileges. R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment ,i 70). The 
district court expressly stated that it did not draw from Campbell's invocation of the Privileges 
any negative inferences related to the Criminal Contempt counts. Id. 
After reviewing the evidence, on November 3, 2016, the district court issued written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See generally R. pp. 486-544 (Contempt Judgment). 
The district court found Campbell guilty of two counts of Civil Contempt and thirteen counts of 
Criminal Contempt. R., p. 542 (Contempt Judgment ,i,i 222 & 223). In reaching its findings of 
fact as to the Criminal Contempt counts, the court expressly stated that "[t]he following findings 
of fact [regarding the criminal contempt charges] are based solely on the documentary evidence 
admitted or judicially noticed during trial. They are not based in any way on Campbell's 
testimony during trial (which related only to the civil contempt counts)." R., p. 499 (Contempt 
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Judgment ,r 70). This documentary evidence included bank statements, check images, and 
Campbell's own written statement provided to Respondents before the trial. See, e.g., Pis.' Trial 
Exs. 3 to 6. 
On December 1, 2016, the district court sentenced Campbell to serve five (5) days in the 
Blaine County Jail for each of the thirteen counts of Criminal Contempt on which he was found 
guilty, for a total of sixty-five (65) days.2 R, pp. 602- 06. Campbell then filed a Motion to Stay 
Execution of Judgment. After a hearing was conducted, the Court stayed the sentence it imposed 
on the thirteen counts of Criminal Contempt of Court pending the outcome of Campbell's 
appeal. 
COUNTERST ATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court not err by imposing a Criminal Contempt sanction in a bench trial that 
did not require Campbell to take the stand as to Criminal Contempt Charges and solely 
required Campbell to take the stand without prejudice to Campbell asserting the Privileges 
as to factually unrelated Civil Contempt charges that Campbell did not request be tried 
separately? 
2. Assuming it was error for the district court to require Campbell to take the stand as to the 
Civil Contempt Charges, should the district court's order imposing a Criminal Contempt 
sentence be affirmed because such error has not been shown and could not be shown to be 
prejudicial in light of the circumstances? 
2 As to the civil counts, the court also sentenced Campbell to jail pending his compliance with 
certain conditions. The jail sentence was initially stayed, and Campbell ultimately complied with 
the conditions without being incarcerated. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The "standard of review applicable to questions of law is one of deference to factual 
findings, but [the Court may] freely examine whether statutory and constitutional requirements 
have been met in light of the facts as found." State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884, 886 (2007). 
Additionally, "[a] party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged errors were 
prejudicial. Alleged errors not affecting substantial rights will be disregarded." Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, 157 Idaho at 122 (internal quotations omitted); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 61 
("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not 
affect any party's substantial rights."). Errors affecting constitutional rights are harmless where 
the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not impact the outcome of 
the case. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471 (2007) (violation of criminal defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights was harmless error). Issues not raised in an opening brief are waived. 
Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 61 (2017). 
Here, the district court's factual findings that the criminal and civil contempt charges 
were factually independent and that its findings regarding the criminal contempt charges were 
unrelated to Campbell's testimony are entitled to deference. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. 
Hosps., Inc., 110 Idaho 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1986) (appellate courts defer to trial court's factual 
findings unless clearly erroneous). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 8 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT HONORED CAMPBELL'S RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AS TO THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
CHARGES IN A TRIAL INVOLVING DISTINCT AND UNRELATED 
CIVIL CONTEMPT CHARGES. 
Campbell argues that, under Rule 75(i)(2), no criminal sanction can be imposed against 
him because he was called to the stand during the contempt trial. Rule 75(i)(2) provides as 
follows: "Trial Rights Required to Impose a Criminal Sanction. The court cannot impose a 
criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent was provided the following rights: ... 
(D) the privilege against self-incrimination[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 75(i)(2). 
Rule 75(i)(2) provides a right against self-incrimination 011/y as to charges of criminal 
contempt. It does not provide that same protection for charges of civil contempt. As Campbell's 
own attorney admitted, "if it was only a civil contempt case, he takes the stand and has the 
potential to invoke the Fifth Amendment" as to particular questions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 256, L. 11-13. 
The district court expressly found that the Civil and Criminal contempt charges were factually 
distinct. Id. at p. 157, L. 22 - p. 158, L. 4. As discussed above, the Criminal Contempt charges 
stemmed from Campbell's lies about his finances and related issues. R., pp. 33-47. These 
charges were unrelated to whether Campbell had the ability to produce the documents that the 
court ordered him to produce. In contrast, the Civil Contempt charges related solely to 
Campbell's failure to produce documents. R., pp. 29- 33. As such, the district court permitted 
Respondents to call Campbell to testify solely as to the Civil Contempt charges. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
137, L. 21-25, p. 158, L. 5-8.3 In other words, the district court permitted Respondents to do 
3 Campbell knew by no later than the February 2016 Charging Affidavit that the contempt trial 
involved both criminal and civil contempt charges. R., pp. 29-47. He also knew that he could be 
called as a witness to testify regarding the civil contempt charges. Despite this knowledge, he 
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exactly what even Campbell admits would have been proper if the Civil Contempt charges had 
been tried separately. 
In the Contempt Judgment, the district court specifically found that Respondents' 
examination was "limited to questions related to the civil contempt charges" and Respondents 
"made no attempt to cross-examine Campbell on the criminal contempt charges." R., pp. 488, 
499 (Contempt Judgment 116, 70). The court also issued separate findings of fact as to the Civil 
and Criminal Contempt charges, and expressly stated that its findings of fact as to the Criminal 
Contempt charges were "based solely on the documentary evidence admitted or judicially 
noticed during trial" and were "not based in any way on Campbell's testimony during trial[.]" 
R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment 1 70). This documentary evidence included bank statements, 
check images, and Campbell's own written statement provided to Respondents before the trial. 
See, e.g., Pis.' Trial Exs. 3 to 6. These documents showed that Campbell told numerous lies 
about such topics as the source of funds that he used to open an account at Bank of America, 
whether he owned a car in 2012, where he was living in 2012, whether he remembered the name 
of the company in whose name Campbell opened the HSBC Hong Kong account, what assets he 
had upon moving to Idaho, and how he paid his rent at a time when his bank records did not 
reflect payment. The evidence used to prove that Campbell lied was not associated with his 
taking the stand, any testimony he gave on the stand, his invocation of the Privileges while on 
the stand, or even his failure to produce documents. Campbell was afforded the full right against 
self-incrimination to which he was entitled under Rule 75(i)(2). 
never requested to have bifurcate the civil and criminal contempt charges. He therefore waived 
this argument. 
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Campbell does not point to any contrary authority. Instead, the primary case on which he 
relies deal with criminal sanctions imposed for civil contempt charges. See Camp v. E. Fork 
Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 865 (2002) (court erred where it announced at the outset of 
proceedings that charges were civil, never advised contemnor that criminal punishment could be 
imposed, and nevertheless imposed criminal sanction for those contempt charges). Campbell 
also relies on out-of-context dicta from State Department of Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155 
Idaho 274, 277 (2013). In Slane, the Court noted that "[i]f both civil and criminal relief are 
imposed in the same proceeding, then the 'criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its 
character for purposes of review." Slane, however, did not involve a trial for factually 
independent charges of criminal and civil contempt. Rather, Slane involved a contempt sanction 
that the district court incorrectly treated as a civil contempt sanction when it was in fact a 
criminal sanction. Here, the district court correctly found that the civil and criminal contempt 
sanctions were factually distinct and, therefore, that Respondents could call Campbell to testify 
solely as to the civil contempt counts. This court should therefore affirm the district court's 
orders finding Campbell guilty of thirteen counts of criminal contempt and sentencing him to 65 
days in jail. 
III. CAMPBELL WAS NOT PREJUDICED AS TO THE CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT CHARGES BY VIRTUE OF TAKING THE ST AND. 
As noted above, a showing of prejudice is required for the district court's Criminal 
Contempt sentence to be vacated. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, LLP, 157 Idaho at 122 
(district court's order affirmed where alleged error did not cause any prejudice to appellant). 
Campbell's right against self-incrimination was respected and he was not prejudiced by any 
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alleged error. 
At bottom, the issue boils down to the Court requiring Campbell to take the stand and 
exercise the Privileges with respect to the Civil Contempt charges in open court, as opposed to 
not taking the stand. Campbell makes no argument on appeal that that this prejudiced him. Nor 
could he. 
First, Campbell was allowed to and did invoke the Privileges when he took the stand. 
Moreover, in the case of a bench trial, there is no concern that the mere act of taking the stand 
prejudiced Campbell. Second, the district court expressly found that Campbell was not asked 
any questions related to the criminal contempt charges, that its findings of fact as to the criminal 
contempt charges were not based in any way on Campbell's testimony during trial, and that its 
findings of fact as to the criminal contempt charges were based solely on the documentary 
evidence admitted or judicially noticed during trial. R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment ,r 70). 
Indeed, the judge in a bench trial is presumed to consider only competent evidence and disregard 
any incompetent evidence. Powell, 120 Idaho at 710. Finally, had the Civil Contempt counts 
been tried separately from the Criminal Contempt counts, the same district court trying the latter 
would have witnessed Campbell taking the stand and assert the Privileges in the former trial. 
There is no reason to believe that any effect on the fact finder under this scenario- a scenario 
that Campbell concedes would have been entirely proper-- would be any different than in the 
trial that was had. 
Even if the district court erred by allowing Respondents to call Campbell to testify as to 
the civil contempt charges, any such error had no effect on the outcome of the trial as to the 
criminal contempt charges. Therefore, any error was harmless and the district court's order 
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should be affirmed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court affirm the 
district court's Contempt Judgment and Sentencing Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ~_ day of March 2018. 
Erin Farrell Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L day of March, 2018, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Neil D. Campbell 
P.O. Box 3372 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
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